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A feigned liberalisation:  
Russia is restricting Gazprom’s monopoly on exports
Szymon Kardaś 
An act restricting Gazprom’s monopoly in Russian gas exports came into effect on 
1 December 2013. Previously Gazprom had had a legal guarantee to its monopoly position. 
The changes are an effect of consultations between various ministries that had been conduct-
ed for many months and were affected by lobbying from Novatek and Rosneft (Gazprom’s 
competitors on the domestic gas market); they need not, though, be seen as system changes. 
The ‘liberalisation’ they appear to bring in is feigned. Proof of this are found for example in 
both the limited material scope of the new law (it concerns only exports of liquefied natural 
gas, LNG) and the small number of the beneficiaries of the new regulations (the new solutions 
will be beneficial for Novatek and Rosneft). Contrary to initial announcements, the right to 
export LNG has not been restricted to South-Eastern Asian markets, which means that Russian 
liquefied natural gas is also likely to be sold to Europe in the coming years. Although these 
changes have been motivated above all by the individual interests of Gazprom’s competitors, 
they are also to a certain extent a response to the processes taking place on regional gas 
markets. They may, therefore, turn out to be beneficial for the state (increasing Russia’s share 
on the global LNG market and attracting foreign investors to gas extraction projects being 
implemented in Russia). The new regulations are probably the first step down the long road 
to breaking Gazprom’s monopoly in gas exports via the pipeline system. 
The origins of the liberalisation
Gazprom was formally recognised as an export 
monopoly in the Federal Law on Gas Export of 
18 July 2006. The company was thus vested with 
the exclusive right to export both gas transport-
ed via pipelines and LNG. This regulation did not 
extend to projects which were implemented by 
energy companies under production sharing 
agreements (PSA), which concerned, for ex-
ample, Rosneft’s project in the Far East. Other 
companies interested in gas exports could enter 
into ‘agency agreements’ with Gazprom Export, 
a company which was acting as an agent in rela-
tions with foreign partners.
The need to put limits on Gazprom’s privileged 
position has been mentioned on numerous oc-
casions in discussions within government cir-
cles1. Formally, the change process was initiated 
in 2012 by Novatek, the key ‘independent’ gas 
producer in Russia. As Novatek’s position pro-
gressively strengthened on the domestic gas 
market, it started demanding to be given the 
right to export liquefied natural gas by itself as it 
was planning to produce LNG as part of the Ya-
1 The options being considered included splitting Gazprom 
by establishing separate companies in charge of gas pro-
duction and transport (this was suggested by German Gref 
in 2000, who was then minister for the economic devel-
opment of Russia) and restricting the company’s export 
privileges (a proposal from the Federal Anti-Trust Service). 
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mal-LNG project. Its management argued that 
this would not only facilitate the conclusion of 
export contracts, but would also contribute to 
attracting more foreign investments in the gas 
extraction sector2. In November 2012, Novatek 
submitted a formal motion to this effect to the 
Ministry for Energy. Along with other ministries3 
one month later the Ministry for Energy grant-
ed this motion and sent a special report to the 
presidential administration. Prime Minister Dmi-
try Medvedev also expressed his support for the 
gas export rules to be liberalised at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos in January 20134. 
However, the key event which triggered the 
change process was the meeting of the Presi-
dential Commission for Strategic Development 
of the Fuel and Energy Sector and Environmen-
tal Security on 13 February 2013, when No-
vatek’s proposal, backed during the discussion 
by the CEOs of Rosneft and Zarubezhneft, Igor 
Sechin and Sergey Kudryashov, was approved 
by Vladimir Putin. 
The form of the liberalisation
The changes were introduced via the amend-
ment of two laws: the Federal Law on Gas 
Export (Articles 1 and 3) and the Federal Law 
on the Grounds for Governmental Adjustment 
of the Foreign Trade (Articles 13 and 24). Pur-
suant to initial demands, the liberalisation 
2 Regular output growth (during the first two quarters of 
this year it was 9% higher when compared to the same 
period last year) and an increase in the share in the gas 
trade on the Russian domestic market (a 17% growth 
in the first two quarters of this year); http://vid1.rian.
ru/ig/ratings/oil11.pdf. Novatek argued that the agency 
agreement it concluded in 2010 with Gazprom Export 
failed to offer it the opportunity to gain adequate finan-
cial support from banks or foreign partners. An anon-
ymous source from the ministry for energy stated that 
some banks (for example, Société Générale) would be 
ready to provide financial backing at a level as high as 
US$18 billion, but only on condition that Novatek has 
obtained the right to export LNG on its own. 
3 The Ministry for the Natural Environment, the Ministry 
of Economic Development and the Federal Anti-Trust 
Service.
4 ‘Pravitelstvo mozhet dopustit Novatek k eksportu gaza’, 
RBK Daily, 24 January 2013. 
of gas exports should be gradual, as regards 
both the depth of the planned changes (lim-
iting the scope of the regulations in terms of 
the subject matter and the entities covered by 
them) and the procedures set for introducing 
the changes (export licences to be issued upon 
conclusion of contracts with LNG importers).
As regards the entities covered by the reg-
ulations, the new acts set general criteria 
which need to be met by companies applying 
for the right to export LNG. Export licences 
can be granted to: 1) companies which operate 
on fields under a licence which as of 1 Janu-
ary 2013 provides for a liquefying plant to be 
built or the liquefaction of the extracted gas; 
and 2) state-owned companies (and their sub-
sidiaries) controlled by the state to more than 
50% which operate on fields located within 
the internal waters, territorial sea and the con-
tinental shelf, including the Black Sea and the 
Sea of Azov, that make LNG from the natural 
gas extracted from these fields, not excluding 
the natural gas extracted as part of production 
sharing agreements. 
In theory, the criteria for granting LNG export li-
cences are general. However, in practice, consid-
ering the situation in the Russian gas sector, the 
group of companies that will benefit from the 
new solution will be very small, and will include 
Novatek, Rosneft and Zarubezhneft (though 
this has not yet been confirmed since the licence 
granted to this company does not provide for 
the construction of a liquefying plant). 
As regards the subject matter of the new 
regulations, Gazprom’s export monopoly 
will be restricted only in the case of liquefied 
natural gas. Nevertheless, the act does not 
provide for a geographical restriction which 
The liberalisation covers only LNG exports, 
and its beneficiaries will be primarily Ros-
neft and Novatek.
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was originally planned (this was the standpoint 
taken by President Putin, Prime Minister Med-
vedev and Rosneft). Initially, it was announced 
that gas export liberalisation will only concern 
projects under which LNG would be supplied to 
Asian markets. 
However, LNG exports will be subject to 
rationing, since prospective exporters will 
have to obtain export licences. In order to 
obtain these licences, they must meet the gen-
eral statutory criteria and sign contracts with 
gas importers (contracts or general terms and 
conditions of contracts). 
One of the most disputed issues during legisla-
tive work was how to identify the authority in 
charge of issuing export licences and the pos-
sible coordination of LNG exports. The Minis-
try for Energy insisted that these competences 
should be assigned to it or possibly to a newly 
created authority reporting to the government. 
Another vision, which Igor Sechin was lobbying 
for, provided that these competences should 
be granted to the Presidential Commission for 
Strategic Development of the Fuel and Energy 
Sector and Environmental Security5. Finally, 
following special presidential instructions, the 
competences were given to the Ministry for 
Energy. The ministry will also be in charge of 
enforcing the statutory obligation which gas 
exporters will have to provide information on 
export volumes and directions. 
The rationale behind the restriction of 
Gazprom’s export monopoly
The main reason behind the introduction 
of the changes were the economic interests 
of the political-business groups who are close 
to Vladimir Putin. The key figures among them 
are Gennady Timchenko, co-owner of Novatek, 
and Igor Sechin, the CEO of Rosneft, both of 
whom are interested in their firms launching 
5 The commission is chaired by Vladimir Putin. Igor Sechin 
serves as executive secretary.
a gas expansion both on the Russian market6 
and abroad (however, considering the limited 
domestic demand, only gas exports to foreign 
markets can guarantee profits). 
The recent moves are also a response to chang-
es taking place on gas markets worldwide, 
in particular the rapid development of the glob-
al LNG market. Proof of this can be found in 
President Putin’s statement; when pointing to 
the need to gradually liberalise LNG trade he 
argued that budget incomes from gas sales 
had been regularly falling partly due to a signif-
icant reduction in supplies to Europe in 2012. 
He also expressed his concern that if Russia fails 
to act quickly, it may lose its chance of enter-
ing the rapidly developing LNG market in 
South-Eastern Asia7. This has also been con-
firmed by declarations from energy companies 
indicating that LNG output from Russian fields 
(primarily those located on the Yamal Peninsu-
la) is to be sold mainly to the promising Asian 
markets, especially to China, Japan, India, South 
Korea and Taiwan. The forecasts available so 
far indicate that gas demand in this region will 
grow significantly until 2025 (up to 600–800 
billion m3 annually), almost 50% of which will 
be demand for LNG8.
Although the Asian direction for Russian LNG 
exports was initially seen as the main reason for 
6 This concerns primarily Rosneft. Rosneft plans to have in-
creased it to 100 billion m3 annually by 2020 (in 2012, it 
was 12.6 billion m3 according to data from CDU TEK; and 
16.4 billion m3 according to data published by Rosneft), 
which will account for 20% of total Russian output. This 
goal will be achieved partly owing to the takeover of Itera 
and several gas companies from Alrosa group.  
7 http://state.kremlin.ru/commission/29/news/17511 .
8 Szymon Kardaś, ‘Russia activates the LNG sector’, East-
Week, OSW, 16 January 2013. 
Russia made this decision not only due 
to the economic interests of political- 
-business groups, but also considering 
the changes on regional gas markets.
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the liberalisation, the final form the regulation 
has taken proves that another major reason 
was the need to protect the Russian position 
on the strategic European gas market. The 
geographic restriction initially planned (exclud-
ing Europe as an LNG export direction for enti-
ties other than Gazprom) was primarily aimed at 
avoiding competition between Russian gas com-
panies (in particular, protecting the position of 
Gazprom, which supplies gas to Europe via pipe-
lines). The final stance taken by the Russian gov-
ernment is proof not only of Novatek’s lobbying 
success (this company was openly opposing the 
imposition of geographical restrictions and also 
declared its interest in exporting LNG to Europe9) 
but also of an evolution in the approach to LNG 
market development in Europe. As recently as 
January 2013, Yuri Sentyurin, the deputy minis-
ter for energy, emphasised that Russia does not 
see Europe as a promising direction for LNG ex-
ports. In turn, in October 2013, when stating the 
rationale behind the bill restricting Gazprom’s 
export monopoly, the government envisioned 
a rapid development of the European LNG mar-
ket and thus made it one of the key arguments 
for the introduction of changes10. 
The president’s decision was also influenced 
by the fact that Gazprom’s efficiency is con-
stantly falling (in particular since it underrated 
the consequences of the shale gas revolution in 
the USA for the implementation of the Russian 
gas strategy, the slow rate of implementing LNG 
projects resulting in Gazprom’s low share in 
global LNG trade, and its weakening position on 
the European gas market) and it is thus decreas-
ingly useful as a foreign policy instrument11. 
9 http://energo-news.ru/archives/109705
10 http://government.ru/dep_news/8006
11 Gazprom has been operating on the LNG trade market 
since 2005 via Gazprom Global LNG Ltd. However, over 
the past few years its LNG output has not increased, 
and its turnovers in LNG trade have fallen (Gazprom’s 
share in LNG trade fell from 1.3% in 2011 to 0.6% in 
2012). In 2003, Gazprom’s share in domestic output was 
97%. At present, its share has shrunk to around 70%. 
As regards foreign markets, its position has been under-
mined most visibly in Ukraine. A. Topalov, ‘Monopoli-
ya prevyshe vsego’, 9 July 2013, http://www.gazeta.ru/
business/2013/07/09/5418225.shtml 
The consequences for the Russian gas 
sector of the liberalisation 
The introduction of this regulation should 
not be treated as a systemic change. This is 
because the initiators of the changes and also 
the sole beneficiaries of them are Gazprom’s 
competitors, so-called “independent gas pro-
ducers”: Novatek and Rosneft (the latter, being 
the largest state-owned oil company, is more 
and more engaged in energy projects on the 
Russian sea shelf, and a great part of the licenc-
es it holds cover gas field operation). Their new 
right to apply for export licences will strength-
en their position in the Russian gas sector, while 
Gazprom’s position is continually weakening. 
The changes, however limited their nature 
may be, may nevertheless have positive con-
sequences for the Russian gas sector. The 
promises that gas export rules will be liberalised 
have alone contributed to an intensification of 
efforts taken by Russian energy companies 
in the LNG sector, including above all speed-
ing up negotiations regarding new contracts 
and, as has been the case with Gazprom, 
the announcement of new LNG projects (the 
complete list of LNG projects in Russia is provid-
ed in Appendix I). By creating makeshift internal 
competition, they can gain more opportunities 
for attracting foreign partners, and thus the 
investments and technologies necessary to im-
plement expensive extraction projects in Russia. 
The first example is the purchase of a 20% stake 
in the Yamal-LNG project by China’s CNPC. 
It is very likely that the curb on Gazprom’s ex-
port monopoly marks the first step on the 
way towards a demonopolisation of pipe-
line gas exports. This has been incidentally 
hinted at by representatives of government 
circles (the Ministry for Energy is considering 
The changes are not system changes, but 
they may have positive consequences for 
the Russian gas sector.
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a scenario under which Nord Stream and South 
Stream will form a separate company, which 
could have a positive effect on excluding both 
pipelines from being covered by the third en-
ergy package regime). On the one hand, voices 
rejecting such proposals can be heard (for ex-
ample, Igor Sechin in his statement in October 
this year pointed only to the need for ongoing 
solutions to problems concerning tariffs for gas 
transport using Gazprom-controlled pipelines). 
Nevertheless, this option has not been ruled 
out by the Russian Minister for Energy, Aleksan-
dr Novak. Furthermore, Rosneft’s deputy CEO, 
Vlada Rusakova (who is in charge of the gas 
sector at the company) said that this scenario 
was very likely. 
Although the new regulations do not provide 
for any special mechanism for the coordina-
tion of Russian LNG exports de iure, the arbi-
trary manner of granting export licences by the 
Ministry for Energy de facto will mean that ul-
timately it is the state who will decide on ex-
port directions and volumes. Another instru-
ment for export control is export duty imposed 
on liquefied gas. The fact that a 0% rate has 
been imposed means that the financial effect 
will be the same as if the duty had not been 
imposed. However, the imposition of this duty 
means major procedural restrictions during the 
customs clearance of goods and can be seen as 
a form of registration of LNG export volumes12.
The consequences of the liberalisation for 
Russia’s position on external gas markets 
The changes may turn out to be beneficial for 
Russia as its position on foreign gas markets 
could become stronger. 
This primarily concerns the South-East Asia 
region, one proof of which are the contracts 
already concluded with potential importers of 
Russian gas (Appendix II).  At the World Econom-
ic Forum in Saint Petersburg in June 2013, Ros-
neft signed LNG supply contracts with Japan’s 
Marubeni and SODECO, and with the trading 
12 ‘D. Medvedev utverdil nulevuyu eksportnuyu poshlinu dla 
SPG’, http://top.rbc.ru/economics/19/11/2013/889794.shtml
company Vitol. In turn, Novatek signed initial 
agreements with China’s CNPC (general contract 
terms and conditions were agreed in September, 
and the contract is to be signed by the end of 
this year). Another consequence of the liberalisa-
tion is the intensification of actions by Gazprom 
itself; by announcing the decision to expand its 
LNG plant operating as part of the only active 
LNG project (Sakhalin-2) and by building another 
one as part of the new project, Vladivostok LNG, 
it hopes to increase its share in the Asian lique-
fied natural gas market. 
The new regulations may also result in Russia’s 
position on the European gas market being rein-
forced. This will mean both an increase in its share 
in LNG trade and the emergence of new Russian 
gas exporters in Europe. This has been illustrat-
ed by Novatek’s plans: the company announced 
on 1 November 2013, one day after the bill was 
accepted by the government, that it has signed 
a 25-year contract with Spain’s largest importer of 
liquefied natural gas, Gas Natural Fenosa. In May 
2013, (unconfirmed) information was leaked that 
Yamal-LNG and Britain’s BP had signed a frame-
work agreement on supplies of liquefied natural 
gas to the United Kingdom13. Seeing Novatek’s 
activity, Gazprom has also intensified actions in 
the LNG sector aimed at supplies to Europe. Gaz-
prom’s board of directors updated the company’s 
strategy of 2008 regarding the production and 
supplies of liquefied natural gas already in Octo-
ber 2012. The company also announced in May 
2013 that it would embark on new LNG projects 
by the Baltic Sea: the construction of a new LNG 
plant in Leningrad Oblast (the exact location is 
not certain yet, probably the Ust-Luga port) and 
a regasification terminal in Kaliningrad. 
13 Furthermore, the output of the Yamal-LNG project will 
also be sold to Novatek’s trader companies (for example, 
Novatek Gas & Power) and France’s Total, which holds 
shares in Yamal-LNG. 
One consequence of the liberalisation may 
also be a strengthening Russia’s position 
on the gas markets in Asia and Europe.
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The fact that Gazprom’s competitors have been 
granted the right to export LNG to Europe pos-
es no essential threat to the interests of this 
state-controlled company. This is because Rus-
sian gas exported to Europe in liquefied form 
would be supplied primarily to those countries 
which do not import gas via pipelines (Spain, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom). A certain 
degree of rivalry could only be expected should 
Gazprom become more active on the Europe-
an LNG market. However, it seems quite unre-
alistic that Gazprom will achieve its ambitious 
plans, considering its financial troubles and 
the fact that infrastructural pipeline projects 
(South Stream) are being pushed through. 
The adopted solution thus de facto means 
that the European market might in a way be 
divided between Russian exporters. It cannot 
be ruled out that the emergence of many new 
Russian suppliers on the European market will 
trigger a broader process of demonopolisation 
of Russia’s gas presence in Europe; this would 
facilitate Moscow’s functioning under the con-
ditions of the third energy package which is be-
ing implemented by the EU member states. 
Conclusions
Both the change process itself (it took longer 
than expected) and the final form the changes 
took prove that rivalry between Russian energy 
companies is intensifying14. The position of en-
ergy lobbyists in the Russian economy and their 
personal links with Vladimir Putin are making it 
14 Initially, the draft changes were to be ready by the mid-
dle of March 2013. The government accepted the final 
version at the meeting on 31 October 2013, and the 
State Duma passed the act on 22 November. At the final 
stage of the legislative work, Rosneft made an unsuc-
cessful attempt to limit the scope of the liberalisation, 
suggesting an amendment following the first reading of 
the act. Pursuant to this amendment, the energy com-
pany holding an export licence would have the right to 
export LNG only from the fields it operates by itself. This 
would exclude the possibility of exporting Russian gas 
in liquefied form obtained on the secondary market. 
Should it be adopted, this amendment would most of 
all have adversely affected the interests of Novatek. 
difficult for him to play the role of arbiter and key 
decision-maker in this strategic sector of the econ-
omy. This is illustrated by the form of the regula-
tions adopted, which are an expression of a kind 
of compromise. It was the president’s intention 
on the one hand to take into account the interests 
of Novatek and Rosneft, and on the other hand 
to protect Gazprom which, despite its weakening 
position resulting from rivalry in the Russian ener-
gy sector at home and also the difficult situation 
on foreign markets, is still an important source of 
funds needed for the implementation of Russia’s 
flagship projects (including financial support for 
Sochi 2014) and probably a major source of in-
come for members of the Russian political elite. 
The new regulations will not bring about any 
major changes in the system. Instead, they will 
rather serve to legally sanction a reconfiguration 
of influences in the Russian gas sector (the weak-
ening position of Gazprom, and the increasing 
significance of Novatek and Rosneft). However, 
it cannot be ruled out that the scope of liber-
alisation will be extended to gas exported via 
pipelines as the ambitions of the ‘independent’ 
gas players grow and the needs to recapitalise 
the Russian energy sector become greater, and 
also considering the challenges resulting from 
the evolution of foreign gas markets. However, 
a complete system change would require not 
only ownership transformation but also a revi-
sion of the principles upon which the function-
ing of the energy sector is based. This is rather 
unlikely in the immediate future. 
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